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In light of the replication crisis in psychology, null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and pvalues have been heavily criticized and various alternatives have been proposed, ranging from slight
modifications of the current paradigm to banning p-values from journals. Since the physics education
research community often relies on quantitative statistical approaches, the challenges the replication
crisis poses to these approaches need to be considered. p-values suffer primarily from the fact that
they carry little information by themselves and lend themselves to misinterpretations. As one
alternative, Bayesian approaches have become increasingly popular as the posterior distributions they
provide carry more relevant information than p-values. In this paper, we discuss practical issues related
to p-values with respect to interpreting and communicating results and how these issues can be
addressed using a Bayesian approach. Drawing on a science education data set, we demonstrate how
Bayesian data analysis methods go beyond p-values and can help to make more valid conclusions and
to communicate them more easily in a manner that lends itself to less misinterpretations.

Introduction
Since its development in the early 20th century, the
concept of p-values in frequentist null hypothesis
significance testing (NHST) has been criticized by
numerous authors based on theoretical and practical
issues (Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer et al., 2004; Ioannidis,
2005; McShane et al., 2017; Meehl, 1967; Simmons et
al., 2011). However, p-values are still pre-dominant in
psychological and more specifically science education
research today (e.g., all papers involving statistical
analysis published in Physical Review Physics Education
Research in 2016 used p-values). Recently, concerns with

1We

NHST and p-values have resurfaced as part of the
discourse about the reproducibility crisis in
psychological and social science (Nuzzo, 2014; Open
Science Collaboration, 2015) with well documented
high profile replication failures as in Carney et al.
(2010). Some researchers even go so far as to argue that
low replication rates are to be expected given the
current statistical paradigm (Smaldino & McElreath,
2016). Various alternatives to current practices have
been proposed in the past. Some within the frequentist
framework suggest modifying the current practice with
p-values, e.g., justifying the necessary p-value levels in
order to claim statistical significance for each study
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depending on design, sample size, etc. (Lakens et al.,
2018) or lowering the conventional significance level
from 0.05 to 0.001 in order to reduce the rate of falsepositives (Benjamin et al., 2018). Others go beyond
current practices and argue for a “new statistic” that
shifts the emphasis to parameter estimation
(Cumming, 2014). Some argue for an even more radical
shift and propose Bayesian approaches (Gigerenzer et
al., 2004; Kruschke, 2013; Kruschke & Liddell, 2017;
Wagenmakers et al., 2018).
Edwards et al. (1963), Cohen (1994), and
Gigerenzer et al. (2004) have provided discussions
about theoretical, mostly epistemic, differences
between frequentist and Bayesian approaches. More
practical discussions have been provided in the context
of structural equation models (SEM) and
developmental research (van de Schoot et al., 2014) or
hypothesis testing and general psychology (Kruschke,
2013; Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012). In this paper,
we demonstrate how Bayesian approaches can be
useful in the context of science education research.
Drawing on linear models as one of the dominant
statistical tools in the field, we show how a Bayesian
approach allows the incorporation of strong theoretical
knowledge or knowledge from previous studies into
statistical analyses and thus can help with interpreting
their data. Further, given how people (including
researchers) struggle with correctly interpreting the pvalues predominant in the frequentist paradigm (Aczel
et al., 2017; Gelman, 2013; Gelman & Stern, 2006;
Gigerenzer et al., 2004; Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016), we
discuss to what extent a Bayesian approach can
support researchers in correctly interpreting statistical
results as well as communicating these results more
transparently.
In order to do so, we walk through the data analysis
of a study in which we investigated how students’ and
scientists’ perceptions of typical practices of scientists
differ. We will provide theoretical background as
necessary and present a broader discussion at the end.

An Applied Example
Background
The sciences face relatively high drop-out rates at
the university level (Brinkworth et al., 2009). Among
others, this may be caused by students having
unrealistic ideas about what scientists do (Sharkawy,
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2012; Solomon et al., 1994). In order to investigate to
what extent students have realistic ideas about what
scientists do, we investigated which activities high
school students, graduate students, and science
professors considered typical for scientists to engage in
on a regular basis.
In order to do so, we administered a questionnaire
to high school students, graduate students, and science
professors which asked them to what extent they
considered that scientists engage in activities such as
“reading a journal article” on a regular basis. The
questionnaire, which was iteratively developed through
a number of pilot studies in order to ensure validity and
reliability, used a Likert-scale ranging from one to
indicate that an activity is considered untypical to four
to indicate that an activity is considered typical (see
Figure 1 for an example question). The activities cover
a range of dimensions (Realistic, Investigative, Artistic,
Social, Enterprising, Conventional + Networking)
(Dierks et al., 2014; Wentorf et al., 2015) that represent
the whole span of activities that scientists engage in,
e.g., social (S) covers activities such as advising a
graduate student whereas investigative (I) covers
activities such as conducting a literature review. For
more details on the questionnaire see (Stamer et al.,
2019).
Sample
A total number of 347 persons participated in the
study (244 high school students, 92 graduate students,
and 10 professors). The high school students aged 16
on average (M=16.4, SD=2.1) came from nine urban
and sub-urban schools in northern Germany. The
graduate students and professors came from a range of
different physical science departments, e.g.,
computational chemistry or astrophysics, from a
number of different German universities. All scales
showed sufficient reliability for the three groups
(average Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .76).
Analysis
In order to investigate to what extent high school
students, graduate students, and professors have
different ideas about what scientists do, we looked at
the three groups on the different RIASEC+N
dimensions. First, we calculated students’ average
score across the questions of the respective dimension.
The number of questions per dimension are 4 (S), 6
(R). and 7 (C). Table 1 shows the mean and standard
2
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deviation of these scores for the three groups on the
C, S, and R dimension. Now, the question arises with
what confidence we can consider the differences and
similarities between the groups as real, i.e., we want to
know to what extent the measured differences and
similarities between the groups are due to random
variation or can be expected to generalize to other high
school students, graduate students, and professors.
How sure are we that high school students and
graduate students really have different ideas about the
activities on the R dimension? Are high school
students and graduate students similar enough on the
C dimension to be considered equivalent? How
confident can we be in the small difference between
graduate students and professors on the R dimension
given the small number of professors? In order to
answer these and similar question, we apply statistical
procedures.

Page 3

The current standard: Using p-values
Let us formulate a statistical model for our data.
In this paper, we will rely on linear models for analysis
as they allow us to use a consistent manner to describe
the statistical models that we will apply and make
differences between the approaches easily visible
(Cumming, 2014; Kruschke & Liddell, 2017). We first
consider the question about the extent to which high
school students and graduate students are really
different on the R dimension. We denote the data for
the R dimension 𝑅𝑖 . The subscript 𝑖 indicates the 𝑖𝑡ℎ
participants score. As in a t-test, we assume that the
scores on the R dimension for high school and
graduate students taken together are approximately2
normally distributed 𝑁(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎). Figure 2 shows the
close alignment of the data for R and a superimposed
normal distribution which justifies the assumption of
normality. In 𝑁(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎), 𝜇𝑖 denotes the mean score on
R and σ the respective standard deviation

Figure 1. Example question from the realistic (R) dimension.

Table 1. Mean and standard deviation for the groups on the C, S, and R dimension
Dimension
C

S

R

Group

Mean

SD

High School Students

3.30

0.44

Graduate Students

3.30

0.49

Professors

3.27

0.72

High School Students

2.52

0.57

Graduate Students

2.62

0.63

Professors

3.65

0.43

High School Students

2.98

0.44

Graduate Students

3.32

0.49

Professors

2.90

0.67

Please note that we make some approximations in this analysis for the sake of simplicity and refer to e.g., Gelman et al. (2012) or
McElreath et al. (2016) for a thorough coverage of Bayesian Data Analysis and Likelihood functions beyond the normal distribution.
2
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Figure 2. Histogram plot of data for R with superimposed normal distribution in black
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In order to get at the difference between the groups,
we write it as a linear relationship for 𝜇𝑖 where
𝛽0 represents the mean of the graduate students, 𝛽1 the
difference in means between the two groups, and the
dummy variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 indicates
whether a participant is a high school or graduate
student: 𝜇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 .
All taken together, this gives the statistical model in
equation (1):
𝑅𝑖 ~𝑁(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎)

(1)

𝜇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
Note that the model assumes that the groups have
similar standard deviations. If this assumption is
violated, we have to extend the model in order to
account for different standard deviations. We use the
statistical software R (R Development Core Team,
2008) in order to estimate the model, which provides
us with t-values, degrees of freedom, and p-values.
Conventionally, the question whether there is a
difference between the groups will be answered based
on the p-values3. In case of this model, the p-value for
𝛽1 is of interest as 𝛽1 describes the difference in means

between high school and graduate students. Running
the model in the statistical software R gives t(334)=6.15, p<.001. But what does that p-value tell us? It gives
the probability for the difference in means taking the
calculated t-value or a more extreme one given the nullhypothesis that the true parameter difference in means
is zero. In other words, the p-value tells us how
(in)compatible the data are with our statistical model
and the respective null-hypothesis of the difference
between the groups being zero (Cohen, 1994;
Gigerenzer et al., 2004; Kruschke & Liddell, 2017;
Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). In this case, the p-value
tells us that our data are very incompatible with the
null-hypothesis of the difference between the groups
being zero. As the value is below the conventional
p=0.05, we conclude that the difference between the
groups is statistically significant and interpret our
results as evidence that there really is a difference
between high school and graduate students regarding
the R dimension of RIASEC+N. However, statistical
significance does not imply practical importance
because small effects of no practical importance can be
highly statistically significant given large samples
(McShane & Gal, 2017). In order to judge the practical
importance of the difference, we draw on effect size
measures such as Cohen’s d which in our case takes the
value of d=0.75, 95% CI [0.51, 1.00], indicating a

Note that when we want to compare multiple groups, p-values need to be corrected in order to account for multiple testing. In the
Bayesian framework, we can address this issue using multi-level modelling techniques (see Gelman et al., 2012).
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol26/iss1/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/vzpw-ng13
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medium to large difference (Cohen, 1992). In sum, in
this case, p-values and the effect size indicate a
practically meaningful difference between the groups
that we would consider real.
Let us turn to high school and graduate students
one the C dimension. Both groups have similar means
and standard deviations, but are they similar enough to
be really considered equal? Running a linear model
gives t(334)=-0.4, p=.69, d=-0.05, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.19].
From p > 0.05, we infer that there is no evidence to
reject the null-hypothesis that the difference between
the groups is zero and conclude that there is no
statistically significant difference between the groups.
Further, d tells us that the observed difference between
the groups is of little practical importance. However,
we cannot consider this evidence that there is no
difference between the groups because our statistical
power could just have been too small to detect a
difference (Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer et al., 2004;
Kaplan, 2014; Kruschke, 2013; Daniël Lakens, 2017).
When we consider high school and graduate students
on the S dimension, we face a similar situation with
t(334)=-1.35, p=.18, d=-0.16, 95% CI [-0.40, 0.08].
Again, the p-value provides no evidence for a
difference between the groups and the observed
difference of d=-0.16, 95% CI [-0.40, 0.08] would still
be considered of little practical importance. However,
if we compare the results from the S and C dimension,
we see hugely different p-values and effect sizes but are
left with the conclusion of no evidence for difference:
In comparison, the data for C appear to indicate that
there is no difference between the groups more
strongly than the data for S which might even suggest
a small – although practically minor – difference
between the groups. However, p-values are not very
helpful in helping us navigate these cases.
The small amount of information a p-value
provides becomes even more pronounced when we
consider the difference between graduate students and
professors on the R dimension: t(10.10)=-1.92, p=.08,
d=-0.64, 95% CI [-1.3, 0.02]4. The p-value provides no
evidence for a difference between the groups but d=0.64, 95% CI [-1.3, 0.02] suggests that we observed a
medium to large effect favoring the graduate students.
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The large observed difference is not statistically
significant because two factors limit the precision on
the estimation: 1) our sample is relatively small as we
only have data from N=10 professors and 2) we had
to modify our statistical model in order to account for
the difference in standard deviations in the two groups.
We did this by adding another linear term for the
standard deviation 𝜎 which leads to the model in
equation (2).
𝑅𝑖 ~𝑁(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖 )

(2)

𝜇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝜎𝑖 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 × 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖

If we report this result, we can argue that we
observe a big difference and that the p-value
approaches the conventional level of statistical
significance. We can even point to data from our pilot
studies that suggests that professors on average score
close to three which is close to the average we observed
in the present study (mean = 2.90) and in general
answered very similarly. Considering the evidence
holistically as the ASA’s statement suggests
(Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016) indicates that there really
is a difference between graduate students and
professors regarding the R dimension. However, the
literature also points out that we are prone to
overestimating the magnitude of effects and potentially
even get the sign of the effect wrong if we face low
statistical power, i.e., in situations with small samples
as in ours (Gelman & Carlin, 2014). In sum, the
information p-values provide about the data remain
somewhat inconclusive.
In this section, we presented one case where pvalues provided evidence for a difference between
groups. Bases on the p-values and the effect size, we
were able to conclude that there is a medium to large
difference between high school and graduate students
with regard to the R dimension. Further, we presented
two cases with data from the S and C dimension where
p-values provided no evidence for difference between

Note that the decimals in the degrees of freedom come from the Welch’s t-test that was used to obtain the p-value. This modified t-test
accounts for the differences in variance between the groups and as indicated in the statistical model in equation 2.
4
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groups and the observed effect sizes suggested small
practical differences. In these cases, we could not
conclude that there really is no difference between the
groups as our sample might have been too small to
detect an effect. Alarmingly, Aczel et al. (2017) found
that taking p > 0.5 as evidence for no difference
between groups is actually happening quite frequently
in psychological journals. A subsequent re-analysis
revealed that in many of those cases the available
evidence for no difference between the groups was
quite weak which might very well be the case with our
results for the S dimension where p = 0.18 and d = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.40, 0.08] could hint at a small effect
which we were not able to detect with the present
sample. Within the frequentist framework, we could
draw on equivalence testing to address this problem as
equivalence testing provides evidence whether the
difference between the groups is in a specified range
around zero in which differences between the groups
can be considered practically irrelevant. However, this
would lead us to a new methodology and set of
software packages which is beyond the scope of this
paper. In the last case we presented, the p-value
provided no evidence for difference, the effect size was
in the medium to large range, and we had information
from a pilot study that supported the medium to large
effect size. However, given the small sample, we also
faced the risk of overestimating the magnitude and sign
of the effect, which again resulted in a situation where
p-values were not providing helpful information.
Within the frequentist framework, we could try to
incorporate the information from the pilot study by
testing a directed hypothesis, i.e., that graduate
students on average report higher values on the R
dimension than professors. However, this would not
use the full data available from the pilot study and
directed hypothesis tests are rarely accepted in science
education research. An alternative would be to draw on
advanced methods and try to incorporate the
information from the pilot study in our statistical
model through penalization. Similar to equivalence
testing, the latter would demand new methodology and
software packages.
Besides the problems we faced when making
inferences because p-values did not provide us with
much information, we also navigated a number of
potential pitfalls when interpreting the p-values. In the
first case where we compared high school and graduate
students on the R dimension, we found p < .001. While

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol26/iss1/4
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the respective effect is conventionally considered to be
highly significant, the magnitude of the effect is not,
because p-values are not a measure of effect size
(Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016) although they are
commonly misinterpreted as such (Gelman, 2013;
Gigerenzer et al., 2004; McShane et al., 2017; McShane
& Gal, 2017; Wagenmakers et al., 2018). Further, we
were careful not to interpret p-values as probabilities
for a hypothesis being true. When we compared
graduate and high school students on the S and C
dimension, we were only able to conclude very little
from the relatively high p-values. A common
misinterpretation is to interpret p-values as the
probability of the null-hypothesis being true (McShane
& Gal, 2017). This misinterpretation may very well be
the cause for the instances where p > 0.05 was
considered evidence for no effect that Aczel et al.
(2017) found in psychological journals.
Before we will explore a Bayesian approach in the
next section, let us consider again the last case where
we compared professors and graduate students on the
R dimension where our p-value bases analysis provided
only inconclusive information, which was due to our
small sample and the lack of a way to incorporate prior
available information into the statistical model. Science
educations’ research often faces the same challenge.
There is a body of substantive theory but researchers
struggle to incorporate it into statistical analyses and
often face small samples that do not allow for precise
parameter estimation (Kaplan, 2014; McNeish, 2016;
van de Schoot et al., 2014).
Going Beyond p-values: Bayesian Data Analysis
In this section, we will introduce the general idea
of Bayesian data analysis and repeat the analyses we did
in the last section in a Bayesian framework. The
Bayesian perspective interprets probability as the
information about uncertainty, i.e., probability
quantifies the (un)certainty of our information about
some aspect of the world (De Finetti, 1992). Bayes’
theorem forms the basis for updating one’s prior
information about something based on data, i.e.,
considering prior information one learns from the data.
Let us see how this works when we reconsider high
school and graduate students on the R dimension of
RIASEC+N again. Equation (3) shows Bayes’
theorem.

6
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𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 × 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑
= 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑

(3)

The prior is the probability distribution that
describes our information about the world before we
have seen the data, i.e., in our case, information about
any differences between high school and graduate
students on the R dimension we know from the
literature or earlier studies. The likelihood summarizes
the information about the world we find in the data,
i.e., in our case, we use a normal distribution in order
to summarize the participants’ scores on the R
dimension, just as we did in the statistical model in
Equation 1. It is often the most influential part in a
Bayesian model. The posterior is the mathematical
consequence of a given prior and likelihood as
specified in Bayes’ theorem. It is the probability
distribution that describes our information about the
world given the data that we have observed, i.e., in our
case, it is the information about differences between
high school and graduate students on the R dimension
that results from the combination of prior information
and data.
Let us specify our statistical model for the
difference between high school and graduate students
on the R dimension in Bayesian terms. Since we
summarize the data the same way, the likelihood
remains the same as in equation (1).
Now we need to specify a prior for each parameter
in the model (𝜎, 𝛽0 , 𝛽1 ), i.e., our prior information
about differences between high school and graduate
students on the R dimension. For the specification of
a prior, we can often draw on the literature or earlier
studies. However, in this case, we have no prior
information available. In such cases, we can specify
what is often called (Gelman et al., 2014; McElreath,
2016b) a weakly informative prior, i.e., a prior
distribution that considers basically all results equally
likely but is skeptical of very extreme results and
encodes natural constraints of the model. Let us first
consider a prior for the standard deviation 𝜎. Popular
prior distributions for standard deviations include
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uniform
(3) distribution and half-cauchy (McElreath,
2016b). For simplicity5, let us consider a uniform
distribution which considers all values in the specified
range equally likely. We know that by definition 𝜎 is
positive and, based on our previous experiences with
the instrument, we consider 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,1) (all values
between zero and one are equally likely) a sensible prior
for the standard deviation. Now, we need a prior for
𝛽0 . In our statistical model, 𝛽0 represents the average
score on the R dimension of the graduate students.
Based on the range of the scale (1-5) and following the
usual assumption in linear models that coefficients are
normally distributed, we use a normal distribution
centered at 2.5 with a standard deviation of 0.75:
𝑁(2.5,0.75). The standard deviation of 0.75
represents that we do not have a lot of information
about how graduate students score on the R dimension
reflects the range of the scale. Finally, we need a prior
for 𝛽1 that describes our prior information about the
difference between the groups. Again, we use a normal
distribution but as we have no prior information about
the difference between the groups, we center it at zero
and use a standard deviation of 0.5: 𝑁(0, 0.5). This
describes that we consider a large range of differences
between the groups equally likely. At the same time, the
model is slightly skeptical of very large differences as
those are not compatible with the range of the scale.
The complete model is shown in equation (4):
𝑅𝑖 ~𝑁(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎)

(4)

𝜇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝜎 ~ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,1)
𝛽0 ~ 𝑁(2.5,0.75)
𝛽1 ~ 𝑁(0,0.5)
Notice how the model is identical to the one
presented in equation (1) except for the priors. If we
had chosen priors that consider all parameter values

Please note that the specification of priors is a very important part of Bayesian data analysis that requires much care. The priors in this
paper present rather simple choices that illustrate the principles. We recommend https://github.com/stan-dev/stan/wiki/Prior-ChoiceRecommendations for advice on prior choices.
5
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equally likely, i.e., priors that include no information,
our model would be equivalent to the one in equation
(1). Thus, from a practical perspective, we could think
of frequentist models as a special case of Bayesian
models where we specify no prior information
whatsoever.
With our statistical model at hand, we can now
estimate the model. We use the open source
probabilistic programming language Stan (Carpenter et
al., 2017) which we access through an R interface called
rethinking (McElreath, 2016a). Stan estimates these
models using Markov-Chain Hamiltonian MonteCarlo sampling. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to explain the sampling method and Markovchains in detail (see e.g., McElreath (2016b) for an
accessible explanation), there are two ways to assess
whether the sampling was successful: visual inspection
of the Markov-chains and the Gelman-Rubin
convergence criterion ̂𝑅 (Gelman et al., 2014). Visual
inspection of the Markov chains is a simple but
powerful way to assess to what extent the Markov-

Page 8

chains have mixed and reached stationary distributions.
Usually, trace plots of the chains should look like
“Hairy Caterpillars” (Figure 3) when the chains have
mixed and reached a stationary distribution. ̂𝑅 shoul
be one to indicate convergence. If ̂𝑅 is above one, the
Markov-chains usually have not converged. Values of
̂𝑅 above 1.01 warrant caution (McElreath, 2016b). For
all models that we ran for this paper, visual inspection
of the Markov-chains and ̂𝑅 indicated that the chains
mixed and reached stationary distributions.
When we estimated the model following the
frequentist paradigm, our software provided us with tvalues, degrees of freedom, and p-values. In the
Bayesian approach, the software provides us with
posterior distributions for every parameter. How do
we use these in order to address the question about the
extent to which high school students and graduate
students are really different on the R dimension? We
calculate the posterior distribution of Cohen’s d which
is displayed in Figure 4 below.

Figure 3. Traceplot of a “Hairy Caterpillar” Markov-chain depicting 3000 samples. The gray box represents the first
1000 samples, which are for warm-up
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Figure 4. Posterior density plot of Cohen’s d for the difference between high school and graduate students on the R
dimension. Gray area marks 95% probability interval
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The posterior describes the probability density of
Cohen’s d for the difference between graduate and high
school students. Using the conventional 95%
threshold, the posterior distribution tells us that there
is a 95% probability that the difference between the
groups ranges between a Cohen’s d of -1 and -0.5 with
the highest probability (the mean of the distribution)
being -0.74. Thus, we can conclude that there really is
a difference between the groups within the range of a
medium to large effect favoring the graduate students.
In this case, the results of a Bayesian approach and a pvalue based approach are very similar. In cases where
we have little to no prior information and sufficient
sample sizes, this is generally to be expected. However,
the plot of posterior of d directly communicates the
magnitude of the effect and the confidence which we
can have in the results. The sharper the peak of the
posterior, the more confident we can be of a result and
the wider the distribution the less confident we can be
of a result. While p-value based confidence intervals
(CIs) in principle can carry similar information, they are
more prone to misinterpretation because CIs do not
necessarily carry distributional information, i.e., while
parameter values closer to the peak of the posterior
distribution are more likely than those at the fringes,
parameter values in the middle of a CI are not

6

necessarily more likely than those at the fringes of the
CI.
Let us now turn to the comparisons of graduate
students and high school students on the C and S
dimension where we faced p-values > 0.05 and thus
were left with somewhat inconclusive results. In both
cases, we have little prior information to guide us in the
specifications of our priors. Thus, we will use priors
similar to those used in Equation 4 and only modify
the prior for 𝛽0 which describes the average score of
the graduate students to be centered around the
observed mean of the graduate students on the
respective dimensions6. Figure 5 shows the posterior
of d for the C dimension. The posterior distribution
tells us that there is a 95% probability that the
difference between the groups ranges between a
Cohen’s d of -0.27 and 0.18 with the highest probability
being -0.05. Further, we see that the posterior is
relatively symmetrically distributed around zero. Our pvalue based analysis of the data did not allow us to
conclude that there was no difference between the
groups and applying equivalence testing would have
led us to a new methodology and new software tools.
In a Bayesian approach however, it is quite easy to
apply the idea of equivalence testing because the
posterior already provides all the information we need.

C: 𝛽0 = 𝑁(2.5, 0.75) , S: 𝛽0 = 𝑁(2.5, 0.75)
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We can define a range of practical equivalence
(ROPE)7 (Kruschke, 2013; Daniël Lakens, 2017), i.e., a
range within which differences between groups have
no practical consequences, although they may be
measurable, e.g., in an educational setting, anything
below the average teacher effect of d = 0.3 (Hattie,
2009) may be considered a small or negligible effect.
Following this definition, we can define a range of
practical equivalence ranging from a Cohen’s d of -0.3
to 0.3 and calculate with what probability the true
difference between the groups lies in that range. We
find that around 98% of probability mass of the
posterior fall into the ROPE. Thus, we can infer that
there is a 98% probability of practical equivalence
between high school and graduate students regarding
the C dimension of RIASEC+N. Thus, the Bayesian
approach easily allows quantifying support for the nullhypothesis of two groups being identical using a range
of practical equivalence8.

shows around 87% of probability mass of the posterior
fall into the ROPE ranging from -0.3 < d < 0.3. In our
p-value based analysis of the S and C dimension pvalues provided little information in general and also
were not very helpful in distinguishing between the two
cases. The Bayesian analysis however makes it easy to
get a better sense of the extent to which the results
provide evidence that high school and graduate
students do not differ on the C and S dimension. On
the C dimension, the Bayesian analysis provides
evidence for practical equivalence between the groups,
in case of the S dimension, the evidence for
equivalence is substantially weaker. When it comes to
communicating our results, the two distinctly different
posterior distributions in Figure 4 and Figure 5 clearly
communicate that the evidence for difference between
the groups is more pronounced in case of C dimension
compared to the S dimension. Because p-values are
often (mis)interpreted in a p >.05 means “no
evidence”9 and p <.05 means “evidence” fashion
(Gelman, 2013; McShane & Gal, 2017), there is a
substantial risk that the results for the C and S
dimension would both have simply been interpreted as
“no evidence for difference”. Thereby, the existing
difference in the confidence of this interpretation for
the C and S dimension would have been missed.

Let us consider the difference between graduate
and high school students on the S dimension. Figure 6
shows the posterior of d for the S dimension. The
posterior distribution tells us that there is a 95%
probability that the difference between the groups
ranges between a Cohen’s d of -0.30 and 0.08 with the
highest probability being -.16. Equivalence testing
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Figure 5. Posterior density plot of Cohen’s d for the difference between high school and graduate students on the C
dimension. Gray area marks 95% probability interval
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Ideally, a ROPE should be defined before any analysis is conducted in order to avoid bias. Also note that ROPEs will vary between
disciplines, area of research etc. What matters is a sound argument for the range of the ROPE.
7

While beyond the scope of this paper, so called Bayes factors can also be used to quantify support for null hypotheses in Bayesian data
analysis (Aczel et al., 2017; Wagenmakers et al., 2018; Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012).
8

9 While some disciplines use different thresholds for p-values, the principle remains the same.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol26/iss1/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/vzpw-ng13

10

Kubsch et al.: Beyond p-values

Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, Vol 26 No 4
Kubsch et al., Beyond p-values

Page 11

2.0
1.5
0.0

0.5

1.0

density

2.5

3.0

Figure 6. Posterior density plot of Cohen’s d for the difference between high school and graduate students on the S
dimension. Gray area marks 95% probability interval
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Figure 7. Posterior density plot of Cohen’s d for the difference between graduate students and professors on the R
dimension. Gray area marks 95% probability interval
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Let us now return to the comparison of graduate
students and professors on the R dimension. Using pvalues, we faced the problem that the p-value was only
approaching the conventional level of statistical
significance while Cohen’s d suggested a medium to
strong effect. Thusly, the results were relatively
inconclusive. We attributed this to the small sample
and the fact that we also had to estimate standard
deviations for both groups. Available prior
information did not help addressing the issue because
we had no way to incorporate the information into the
statistical model. Now, the Bayesian approach allows

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2021
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us to incorporate this information into the statistical
model. In a pilot study, we already saw that professors
very consistently scored close to three. We encode this
information in the prior for 𝛽0 which describes the
average score of the professors. As in the previous
cases, we use a normal distribution centered at three
but now we will use a smaller standard deviation of
only 0.1 in order to describe that we are relatively
confident in values close to three based on the results
from the pilot study: 𝛽0 ~ 𝑁 (3, 0.1). For the other
parameters, we choose priors as in the previous cases.
Equation (5) shows the full statistical model.
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strongly reflect prior available information are often
called informative priors (Gelman et al., 2014) and it is
through informative priors that Bayesian data analysis
is often better prepared to handle problems with small
samples (McNeish, 2016; van de Schoot et al., 2014).
However, for transparencies sake, it is important to
clearly state the assumptions that went into the
formulation of the priors and when using informative
priors, we should also conduct a sensitivity analysis in
which we re-run the model with an only weakly
informative prior and compare the results. Figure 8
shows the posterior that resulted from estimating the
model with a weakly informative prior and the
posterior that resulted from estimating the model with
the informative prior in one panel. The posterior
estimated with a weakly informative prior is notably
wider than the posterior estimated with an informative
prior, reflecting the reduced precision of the estimate.
The posterior describes that there is a 95% probability
that the difference between the groups ranges between
a Cohen’s d of 0.00 and 1.36 with the highest
probability being 0.67. Thus, this posterior is not as
strong evidence for a difference between the groups as
the one derived from an informative prior but it points
in a generally similar direction, thus supporting the
general rationale of our informative prior. If the weakly
informative prior had yielded totally different results,
we would have to question the choice of our
informative prior or at least would have to discuss it
more thoroughly. As the two posteriors in Figure 8

(5)

𝑅𝑖 ~𝑁(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖 )

𝜇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝜎𝑖 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 × 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝛽0 ~ 𝑁(3, 0.1)
𝛽1 ~ 𝑁(0, 0.5)
𝛽2 ~ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,1)
𝛽3 ~ 𝑁(0,0.5)
We estimate the model and calculate the posterior
of d for the R dimension. The posterior distribution
(Figure 7) tells us that there is a 95% probability that
the difference between the groups ranges between a
Cohen’s d of 0.35 and 1.16 with the highest probability
being 0.74.
This result is very different from the one we
obtained in our p-value based analysis. By
incorporating our prior information about the
professors into the statistical model, we found
evidence that suggests that there really is a medium to
strong difference between graduate students and
professors with respect to the R dimension. Priors that
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Figure 8. Posterior density plot of Cohen’s d for the difference between graduate students and professors on the R
dimension. The distribution with a sharp peak resulted from estimating the model with informative priors, the wide
distribution resulted from estimating the model with a weakly informative prior. Gray area marks 95% probability
interval
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basically represent the two extreme cases of prior
specification (weakly informative and strongly
informative), we also get a sense of how our prior
information influences the result. If we re-estimated
the model with another less strongly informative prior,
the posterior would be somewhere between the two
depicted in Figure 7. Another way to check the
accuracy of our model is to look at a posterior
predictive plot.
In such a plot, we compare the actual data with the
prediction simulated from the fitted model. Figure 9
shows the data from the professors and graduate
students, simulated data from the model with weakly
informative priors, and informative priors. Comparing
the boxplots in the left panel in Figure 9, we see that
the simulated results from the model with informative
priors have less spread than the simulated results from
the model with weakly informative priors which

Page 13

reflects that our informative prior was specified to
represent greater confidence in parameter values close
to three for the professors. We see a similar thing in
the right panel with the graduate students. The
simulated data from the model with the informative
prior appear to capture the observed data better than
the simulated data from the model with weakly
informative priors. Thus, the posterior predictive plot
lends credibility to how we specified the informative
prior and is generally a helpful tool to check model fit.
In sum, the Bayesian analysis allowed us to easily
incorporate prior information into our statistical
model, which is rather complicated in standard
frequentist approaches. This, in turn, allowed us to
obtain informative posterior distributions that provide
more conclusive information than p-values about
difference between graduate students and professors
on the R dimension.

Figure 9. Posterior predictive check graph showing boxplots of the actual data of the professors and graduate
students on the R dimension, and results simulated from the fitted model with weakly informative and informative
priors
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General Discussion
Making Inferences and Communicating Results
We used a standard p-value driven approach and
Bayesian data analysis to analyze data in order to
answer the question to what extent high school
students, graduate students, and professors have
different ideas about what scientists do. In case of two
clearly different groups (high school and graduate
students on the R dimension) and large samples, pvalues gave us confidence that the observed difference
was not random. In case of two relatively similar
groups (high school and graduate students on the S and
C dimension), standard p-value based methods allowed
us only to say that there was no evidence for difference
between the groups, but not to quantify how good the
evidence was for no difference between the groups. In
case of a small sample of professors, a large effect size,
but a p-value only approaching the level of statistical
significance, we found ourselves in an inconclusive
situation as we had no way of incorporating prior
information in the estimation process of the statistical
model. Using Bayesian data analysis, our results
mirrored those of the p-value based approach in case
of a clear difference in the data and a large sample. In
general, differences between Bayesian and frequentist
approach will be small if we have large samples and
little prior information. However, in the other two
cases, Bayesian data analysis allowed us to reach
conclusions that went beyond the p-value based
analysis. The posterior as the standard Bayesian
“result” of an analysis allowed us to easily quantify how
good the evidence was for no difference between high
school and graduate students on the C dimension.
Further, it allowed us to compare that to the difference
between high school and graduate students on the S
dimension which revealed that in case of the S
dimension, the evidence was far from suggesting no
difference between the groups. Lastly, when we faced
the small sample of professors, we were able to include
prior information about the professors into our
statistical model, which resulted in a more precise
estimation and thus allowed us to conclude that there
really is a difference between professors and graduate
students on the R dimension. Note that this inclusion
of prior information in a prior is distinctly different
from including e.g. a covariate in a regression model in
order to account for a possible confounding variable.
In the latter case, we add variables to better reflect the
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol26/iss1/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/vzpw-ng13
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structure of our design or theoretical model, however,
we do not specify prior information about that variable
itself.
In general, our results mirror the practical
advantages of Bayesian data analysis we find in the
literature: 1) Bayesian methods can improve estimation
in small sample situation through incorporation of
prior information which is often available in science
education (McElreath, 2016b; McNeish, 2016; van de
Schoot et al., 2014). 2) Once acquired, the Bayesian
tool set provides a coherent framework for a range of
tasks that often require specialized software packages
in the frequentist approach (equivalence testing,
penalization, missing value imputation, multi-level
modelling). Further, p-values are often misinterpreted
and lend themselves to dichotomous thinking (Aczel et
al., 2017; Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer et al., 2004;
Kahneman, 2012; Kruschke & Liddell, 2017; McShane
& Gal, 2017). Posterior distributions as a primary way
to communicate results appear to be less prone to
dichotomous misinterpretation as their shape describes
how confident we are that the true value lies inside a
given range. Further, since we have to justify our priors
in a Bayesian approach, we make the statistical model
explicit and can no longer hide behind jargon such as
t-test. This should help researchers understand the
models of their fellow colleagues better and see the
assumptions that the researchers made when analyzing
and interpreting their data. An issue which can hardly
be overestimated in importance in light of the
replication crisis in psychological and social science.
Limitations
The downside of the possibilities that specifying
priors provide, is, that it is not always trivial to specify
one and that the influence of priors on results has to
be discussed as part of a sensitivity analysis (Gelman et
al., 2014). Further, fitting Bayesian models is
computationally intensive and thus takes longer. The
bright side, however, is that Bayesian models may fit
where frequentist maximum likelihood methods do
not converge (McNeish, 2016; van de Schoot et al.,
2014). Thus, apart from large-scale applications where
the most prominent practical advantages of the
Bayesian approach do not apply because the influence
of priors is negligible and the benefit of distributional
information ceases to exist in light of very precise
estimation, Bayesian models should be considered as a
viable alternative. Lastly, there is an issue with the
14
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communication of Bayesian results. Standards and
conventions of what needs to be communicated in a
scientific paper are simply not as developed as for the
classical frequentist methods and people are often not
as familiar with Bayesian methods as they are with
frequentist ones. Thus, more explanation may be
needed in order to adequately and successfully
communicate the results of Bayesian data analysis.
Lastly, we want to clarify that the results of Bayesian
data analysis as well as any other statistical approach
have to be carefully considered in the context of the
actual study in which the data were collected and that
the advantages of Bayesian data analysis we have
demonstrated cannot solve flaws in the design of a
study.

Conclusions
Our examples have focused on two practical
advantages of Bayesian data analysis: 1) posterior
distributions are more informative than p-values which
allows for deeper analysis, and 2) incorporating prior
information allows for better estimation and thus
inferences. We also value the Bayesian approach
because it appears to bridge a fundamental gap
between data analysis and the knowledge base we build
in science education research. Based on substantive
theory, we can often make strong assumption about
the relationship of variables before we have measured
them. This reflects the body of knowledge science
education research has built. However, if we follow the
frequentist paradigm in our statistical models, we
struggle to reflect that knowledge in our statistical
models. The prior in Bayesian data analysis allows
reflecting our knowledge as researchers in our
statistical models. Thus, Bayesian data analysis can help
produce statistical models that are closer tied to theory
and thus better reflect what we know about the world
(Fiedler, 2017; Muthén & Asparouhov, 2012).
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